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BLD-334        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-2356 
 ___________ 
 
 HENRY UNSELD WASHINGTON, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
JAMES L. GRACE; DAVID J. WAKEFIELD; R. M. LAWLER; MELVIN S. 
LOCKETT; DORINA VARNER; S. GLUNT; J. FISHER; K. KAUFFMAN; BARBARA 
HOLLIBAUGH; SCOTT WALTER; M. HARMAN; LT. JOHNSON; G. WALTER; LT. 
BAIRD; LT. R. LALLI; T. HOLTZ; J. EWING; R. COOPER; SGT. JOHNSON; SGT. S. 
MIRABELLA; SGT. BUSKO; MS. AMY R. GINTER; MS. P. GRISSINGER; A. 
STRATTON; DANNILLE GEORGE; YOUNKER; M. B. MCKNIGHT; 
CORRECTIONS OFFICER S. GRASSMEYER; R. PROKOP; L. J. RHODES; M. 
MILLS; F. G. MILLS; M. W. LONG; N. G. BARTLEY; C. V. TADDEI; LEHMAN; C. 
F. YEDOLOSKY; J. K. YOST; D DECKER; G. C. BERGER; CORRECTIONS 
OFFICER D. J. EVERHART; HALL; MR. SHOWALTER; M. D. DONALDSON; R. A. 
STEVER; CORRECTIONS OFFICER M. A. GARZARELLA; J. BARR; N. L. GROVE; 
B. R. SEMPLE; C. L. HAND; A. L. GOODWIN; W. C. COLEGROVE; A. J. JONES; S. 
BRUSH; WHEATLAN; TIMOTHY PROUGH; L. SMITH; B. SMITH; B. BUTLER; 
MCCLAIN; HOSLER; MARY LOU SHOWALTER; DR. ROMEO; DR. ARANEDA; 
DR. SOLOMON; F. KLEMICK; ROBERT ATLMAN; MS. D. MILLS; MS. A. 
BROWN; MS. A. AUMAN; WALTER WILLIAMS, Prison Health Services Nurse 
Supervisor; T. C. GEMBINSKI; HARRY E. WILSON; DEPUTY WARDEN LINDA D. 
HARRIS; DEPUTY WARDEN MARK KRYSEVIG; CAROL SCIRE; EDWARD 
MANCHAS; SCOTT NICKELSON; MICHAEL ZAKEN; CHARLES POWLEY; LT. 
MOZINGO; LT. CRUMB; GEORGE REPOSKY; JON TUSTIN; GARY ABRAMS; 
CHRISTINA SORBIN; ROY BARNES; SGT. SHOMPERT; SNYDER; 
CRUTCHMAN; DOBRYZINSKI; PEASTRACK; KOVAL; RICHTTER; MARK 
POWELL; HAYDEN; D. EVANS; ROBERT TRETINIK; M. HERBIK, Doctor for PHS; 
CHRISTOPHER MEYER; PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC; SHARON M. 
BURKS; MICHAEL FARNAN, PA DOC Chief Counsel; ALLAN B. FOGEL; 
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN; JOHN S. SCHAFFER; SHIRLEY MOORE; JEFFREY A. 
BEARD, PA DOC Commissioner; C. RODDY, Corrections Officer - SCI Huntingdon; 
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PEER; DARNEY; EBY; KENDRICK; DICKSON; STEVENS; SGT. 
BUMGARDENER; SGT. CLAPPER.; PAIGE; CHILCOT; EBERLING; J. MARTELL; 
MCCLOSKEY, Corrections Officer - SCI Huntingdon; SCHROYER; NELSON; J. J. 
MAINELLO; CAMPBELL; PYLE; WESTOVER; DR. SHOAF; MR. HARRY 
POLAND; KYLE; KYLER; MICHAEL KOLOPOTOSKI, SCI-Dallas Warden; S. 
BOHINSKI, Doctor for PHS; O’BRIEN, Physicians’ Assistant; JOSEPH F. 
MAZURKIEWICZ, SCI Pine Grove Warden; MS. DUREE AHMED, Doctor for PHS; 
LOUIS FOLINO, SCI Greene Warden; MARK CAPOZZA, SCI Deputy Warden; 
JEFFERY MARTIN, SCI Deputy Warden; DANNY DAVIS, SCI Wardens Assistant; 
DIANE THOMAS, SCI Administrative 2; LORINDA WINFIELD, SCI Major; C. 
HAYWOOD, SCI Captain of Security; P. WALKER, SCI RHU Commander; LT. 
DURCO, SCI H-Block Lieutenant; LT. ARMSTRONG, SCI H-Block Lieutenant; SGT. 
FARRIER, SCI H-Block Sergeant; D. SWART, SCI Counselor; IRMA VIHLIDAL, PHS 
Health Care Administrator; NEDRA GREGO, Nurses Supervisor for PHS; JOHN 
MCANANY, Nurses Supervisor for PHS; ROBERT DIETZ, Psychiatric Coordinator for 
PHS; B. JIN, Doctor for PHS; MICHELE ANTANOVICH, Nurse Practitioner for PHS; 
MICHELLE L. HOWARD-DIGGS, Physicians Assistant for PHS; ASSAD KAHN, 
Psychiatrist for PHS; LORI WHITE, PA DOC Deputy Commissioner; J. SMITH, 
Corrections Officer 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 4:08-cv-01283) 
 District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 11, 2013 
 Before:  HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed: August 9, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 When this long-lived litigation was last before us, we were called upon to 
determine whether pro se plaintiff Henry Unseld Washington had successfully pleaded 
claims upon which relief could be granted.  It was not an easy task.  Washington had filed 
two separate lawsuits in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging in each the 
existence of a vast, virulent conspiracy that was targeting him in retaliation for his 
outspoken tendencies and past litigation.  Over the course of hundreds of separate, 
handwritten counts, Washington implicated Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
employees (and their associates) in conduct both brutal and bizarre, and his style of 
pleading did no favors to those tasked with deciphering, digesting, and responding to his 
claims.  The District Court had determined that neither suit should survive the dismissal 
stage; and, conducting plenary review on appeal, we agreed in large part with its 
decisions.  But nestled amongst the hundreds of allegations in each suit were a small 
number that were both well pleaded and not facially meritless.  We therefore vacated the 
District Court’s judgments, in part, and remanded for further proceedings on these 
claims, deferring to the District Court’s broad case-management discretion regarding 
“how best to manage those allegations that . . . appear[ed] in both cases.”  See 
Washington v. Grace, 445 F. App’x 611, 616–17 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential 
per curiam); Washington v. Grace, 455 F. App’x 166, 171 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(nonprecedential per curiam). 
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 Consolidating the cases into a single matter (M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 4:08-cv-01283), 
the District Court asked Washington to file a revised amended complaint containing “all 
of the issues set forth in the court of appeals’ opinion[s].”  Order 1, ECF No. 69.  The 
Court initially gave Washington fourteen days to accomplish this task; in response, 
Washington requested a 180-day extension.  See Mot. for Time Enlargement ¶ 5, ECF 
No. 70.  As the District Court would explain in its February 7, 2012 order denying further 
leave to amend: 
Washington estimates that it may take him as much as an additional 18 
months to [submit his final amended complaint].  Washington has also 
tendered to the Court what he describes as the first installment on this 
proposed amended complaint which may take a year and a half to 
complete—a 75 page tome which names more than 150 defendants, repeats 
dozens of dismissed claims, and contains in excess of 140 separately 
numbered paragraphs, many of which re-allege claims that have already 
been found wholly wanting.  Given Washington’s assertion that this 
document represents only 25% of his entire proposed amended complaint, 
it is anticipated that when Washington completes this pleading, which he 
currently estimates may be sometime in the summer of 2013, the amended 
complaint will be 300 pages in length and will contain more than 560 
separately numbered paragraphs.       
Washington v. Grace, No. 4:08-CV-1283, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15173, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 
Feb. 7, 2012).  Instead of allowing further amendment, the Court ordered service of 
Washington’s previous amended complaint, instructing the defendants “to respond only 
to those averments that were previously specifically identified by the court of appeals as 
meriting a response.”  Id. at *6.  The defendants filed their answer in November 2012. 
 Forward momentum, however, was to be short lived, for although the District 
Court granted the defendants’ request to depose Washington via videoconference, 
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Washington did not entirely comply with this obligation.  He was physically present for 
the 2013 videoconference, but refused to answer any questions until counsel for the 
defendants had read a “declaration” provided by Washington that “pertain[ed] to [his] 
situation.”  1st Dep. Tr. 7:3–4, ECF No. 118.  Washington did not become any more 
compliant, and the deposition was ended.  As a result, the defendants moved for sanctions 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, arguing that dismissal of the action would be an 
appropriate sanction to impose in light of Washington’s conduct; in the alternative, the 
defendants requested an order compelling Washington’s cooperation going forward.   
 The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to compel, directing 
“Washington to submit to a deposition within 30 days,” while warning him that “a failure 
to comply with this order may result in sanctions, including this dismissal of this 
lawsuit.”  Order 4, ECF No. 120.  The second deposition met much the same fate as the 
first.  Washington appeared, but was unresponsive; every question was answered with a 
non sequitur about his life being in imminent danger.  See, e.g., 2d Dep. Tr. 11:16–21, 
ECF No. 134 (“Q: Do you have any children, Mr. Washington? A: My life is in danger at 
this prison. Sir, I’m being abused.  . . . I’m being denied medical treatment.  I can barely 
talk.”).  The defendants renewed their request for sanctions. 
 In a thorough Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recounted the 
history of the case, and—weighing the six factors of Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
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Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984)
1
—concluded that the extreme sanction of dismissal with 
prejudice was warranted.  See Washington v. Grace, No. 4:08-CV-1283, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 62390, at *28–36 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2013).  The District Judge “fully agree[d]” 
with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis, emphasizing Washington’s history of dilatory 
conduct, the hurdles impeding an orderly defense, and the inadequacy of lesser sanctions.  
See Washington v. Grace, No. 4:08-CV-1283, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61862, at *15–17 
(M.D. Pa. May 1, 2013).  The District Court therefore overruled Washington’s objections 
and dismissed this complaint with prejudice.  This appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “It is well-settled that a court 
has discretion to issue sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders.”  Ali v. 
Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 957 (3d Cir. 1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v).  Because 
“[d]ismissal must be a sanction of last, not first, resort,” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869, “we will 
be guided by the manner in which the court balanced the Poulis factors and whether the 
record supports its findings,” Sims, 788 F.2d at 957.  No single Poulis factor is 
dispositive, and not all need to be satisfied in order to appropriately dismiss a complaint 
under the test.  Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 
 Having reviewed the record, we are in full accord with the District Court’s Poulis 
                                                   
1
 Those factors are: “(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice 
to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to 
discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the 
attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than 
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness 
of the claim or defense.”  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. 
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analysis.  We recounted this case’s procedural history above to make abundantly clear 
that both this Court and the District Court have afforded Washington numerous courtesies 
of both the interpretive and procedural sort, despite the frequently abusive and peculiar 
nature of his filings and his tendency to confuse the trivial with the treacherous.  See 
Washington, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61862, at *16 (“We and the Court of Appeals have 
given the Plaintiff every possible opportunity to litigate his potential claims, and he has 
frustrated or blocked every method we have employed.”); see also Washington, 445 F. 
App’x at 614 n.4 (declining to invoke Poulis in the first instance during Washington’s 
previous appeal).  As Washington admits, he struggles with mental-health issues, which 
could be a partial cause of his dilatoriness and might, in some circumstances, be 
misinterpreted as bad faith (we are not privy to details of his condition and do not know if 
his psychiatric ailment is exactly as he describes it).   
But the reality is that, five years on, this litigation is no closer to completion, even 
after Washington’s claims were winnowed down to a manageable number by our prior 
decisions.  Instead of moving forward on those claims, Washington has obstructed, 
delayed, and—perhaps most egregiously—failed to even minimally comply with 
discovery, effectively sabotaging two scheduled, court-ordered depositions.  Rather than 
attend to his obligations to keep the litigation moving forward, Washington submitted 
numerous supplemental motions and declarations that added to, rather than subtracted 
from, the volume of pending issues.  See, e.g., Washington, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
62390, at *33–34 (“For example, Washington now repeatedly insists that he is the subject 
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of forced male mammary lactation experiments by prison doctors  at SCI Greene . . . .”); 
Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 129 (accusing a Dr. Park of discontinuing Washington’s 
“enhancement snack bag”).  Good or bad faith aside, “District [C]ourt judges, confronted 
with litigants who flagrantly violate or ignore court orders, often have no appropriate or 
efficacious recourse other than dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.”  Mindek v. 
Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992).  “The present case exemplifies the very kind 
of situation that warrants dismissal.”  Id.  Thus, under our “deferential” review, see Ware 
v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003), we conclude that the District 
Court’s Poulis analysis, and its decision to impose the extreme sanction of dismissal, 
represented a proper exercise of its discretion. 
Despite appealing the District Court’s judgment, Washington has not meaningfully 
explained his conduct, nor has he even argued that the District Court acted in 
contravention of its broad discretion.  We conclude, therefore, that this appeal “lack[s] an 
arguable factual or legal basis,” and must be dismissed in its entirety as frivolous 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 
1989).   
